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III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE. 
A. Nature of Case. 
This case is an appeal of defendant Junior Larry Hillbroom's (hereafter "Hillbroom") 
conviction of misdemeanor violation of a no contact order. Hill broom contends that, as a matter 
of law, the State cannot prove an essential element of the crime, to wit: the issuance of a valid no 
contact order. The State cannot prove the issuance of a valid no contract order because the order 
was fatally defective in that it failed to contain an expiration date as required by Criminal Rule 
46.2(a)(3). 
B. Course of Proceedings. 
On September 18, 2012, Hillbroom was cited for misdemeanor Violation of a No Contact 
Order. (R., Vol. I, p. 20). On December 14, 2012, Hillbroom filed a Motion to Dismiss. (R., 
Vol. I, p. 72). On January 15, 2013, the Court issued an order denying Hillbroom's motion to 
dismiss. (R., Vol. I, pp. 115-124). On January 17, 2013, a jury found Hillbroom guilty of the 
crime charged. (R., Vol. I, p. 138; Tr., Vol. II 1, p. 95, L. 14-16). Hillbroom timely appealed to 
the District Court. (R., Vol. I, pp. 139-140). 
On October 2, 2013, the Honorable Jeff M. Brudie, District Judge, affirmed the ruling of 
the magistrate court. (R., Vol. I, pp. 169-175). Hillbroom timely appealed to this Court. (R., 
Vol. I, pp. 176-178). 
1 Volume I of the transcript references "Motion to Dismiss." Volume II of the transcript 
references "Jury Trial." 
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C. Statement of the Facts. 
On June 24, 2012, Hillbroom was charged with domestic violence in violation of LC. § 
18-918 in Bonner County case number CR-2012-2908. (R., Vol. I, p. 115; Tr., Vol. II, p. 12, L. 
2-7). On June 25, 2012, magistrate judge Debra Heise issued a no contact order pursuant to LC. § 
18-920; (R., Vol. I, p. 32; Tr., Vol. II, p. 12, L 2-7). The no contact order required that 
Hillbroom have no contact with his girlfriend, and mother of his infant baby, Candice Marie 
Fournier. (R., Vol. I, p. 32; Tr., Vol. I, p. 15, L. 7 and p. 64, L. 1-19). 
The order itself is on a standard court form. The form states that following: 
THIS ORDER CAN BE MODIFIED ONLY BY A JUDGE AND WILL 
EXPIRE: At 11 :59 p.m. on ________ or upon dismissal 
of this case, whichever occurs first. 
(R., Vol. I, p. 32). 
The judge failed to enter an expiration date in the blank portion of the form. 
On August 1, 2012, Hillbroom was bound over for trial in the underlying domestic 
violence matter. (R., Vol. I, p. 34 ). At the same time the magistrate modified the no contact 
order to allow certain "3 rd party contact." (R., Vol. I, p. 33). Again, the expiration date was not 
filled-in. 
On September 18, 2012, Ms. Fournier saw Hillbroom in the parking lot outside of the 
Bonner County Courthouse. (Tr., Vol. I, pp. 68, L. 22-25). She decided to join Hill broom in his 
truck and handed him his infant son. (Tr., Vol. I, pp. 22-25). A VAST advocate, Christina 
Scholten, saw Ms. Fournier enter Hillbroom's truck and hand the baby to Hillbroom. (Tr., Vol. 
1, p. 24, L. 13-18 and p. 31, L. 10-14). Ms. Scholten reported the contact to a court bailiff who 
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went outside and also saw the contact between Ms. Fournier and Hillbroom. (Tr., Vol. 1, p. 39, 
L. 24-25 and p. 40, L. 1-3). 
On January 11, 2013, district judge Steve Yerby dismissed the underlying domestic 
violence case on the State's motion. (R., Vol. I, p. 117, L. 12-15). On January 15, 2013, the 
magistrate court denied Hillbroom's motion to dismiss, ruling that the no contact order was in 
compliance with I.C.R. 46.2 even though it failed to contain an expiration date. (R., Vol. I, pp. 
122-123). On January 17, 2013, a jury found Hillbroom guilty of the crime of violating a no 
contact order. (R., Vol. I, p. 138; Tr., Vol. II, p. 95, L. 14-16). 
IV. ISSUE PRESENTED. 
As a matter of law, can the State prove the crime of violation of a no contact order where 
the no contact order is defective because it fails to comply with the mandatory requirement to set 
out the order's expiration date? 
V. ARGUMENT. 
The trial court held that the no contact order in this case complies with I.C.R. 46.2 even 
though the court failed to set out the order's expiration date. The trial court erred. The criminal 
rule, as interpreted by this Court, requires that a no contact order contain a specific expiration 
date, as well as the alternative "dismissal of the case, whichever first occurs." The defect in the 
Hillbroom no contact order renders the State unable to prove the crime of violation of a no 
contact order, I.C. §18-920, because it cannot prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a valid no 
contact order had been issued by the court. However, the State is not without remedy. The State 
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can still petition for enforcement under the contempt statutes where the order is, under the facts, 
clear and unambiguous. 
A. Standard of Review. 
The Supreme Court has free review of the issue in this case. An appellate court exercises 
free review of a trial court's decision regarding the interpretation of an Idaho Criminal Rule. 
State v. Weber, 140 Idaho 89, 91, 90 P.3d 314,316 (2004). When reviewing a case on a petition 
for review from a lower appellate court, the Supreme Court gives "due consideration" to the 
decision of the appellate court but "directly reviews the decision of the trial court." State v. Lute, 
150 Idaho 837,839,252 P.3d 1255, 1257 (2011). 
B. The No Contact Order Was Defective Because It Failed To Set Out An 
Expiration Date. 
The no contract order issued by the magistrate court was defective because it did not 
contain an expiration date as required by criminal rule and by this Court. 
A court has the authority to issue a no contact order when the defendant is charged with 
an alleged assault. The statute states: 
When a person is charged with or convicted of an offense under section 
18-901, 18-903, 18-905, 18-907, 18-909, 18-911, 18-913, 18-915, 18-
918, 18-919, 18-6710, 18-6711, 18-7905, 18-7906 or 39-6312, Idaho 
Code, or any other offense for which a court finds that a no contact order 
is appropriate, an order forbidding contact with another person may be 
issued. A no contact order may be imposed by the court or by Idaho 
criminal rule. 
LC.§ 18-920(1). 
The form of the no contact order is set out in Criminal Rule 46.2. The rule states: 
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( a) No contact orders issued pursuant to Idaho Code § 18-920 shall be in 
writing and served on or signed by the defendant. Each judicial district 
shall adopt by administrative order a form for no contact orders for that 
district. No contact orders must contain, at a minimum, the following 
information: 
(1) The case number, defendant's name and victim's name; 
(2) A distance restriction; 
(3) That the order will expire at 11:59 p.m. on a specific date, or upon 
dismissal of the case~ 
( 4) An advisory that: 
(a) A violation of the order may be prosecuted as a separate crime 
under I.C. § 18-920 for which no bail will be set until an appearance 
before a judge, and the possible penalties for this crime, 
(b) The no contact order can only be modified by a judge, and 
( c) When more than one domestic violence protection order is in place, 
the most restrictive provision will control any conflicting terms of any 
other civil or criminal protection order. 
I.C.R. 46.2(a) ( emphasis added). 
The trial court treated the obligation to include an expiration date on the no contact order 
as discretionary. This is incorrect. The criminal rule states that a no contact order issued 
pursuant to I.C. § 18-920 "must contain" an expiration date. I.C.R. 46.2(a)(3). The word "must" 
means "mandatory." Roesch v. Klemann, 155 Idaho 175,307 P.3d 192, 195 (2013). 
The trial court also wrongly implied that it had a choice as to the expiration date and 
therefore did not need to fill in a date certain. The trial court stated: 
In this case, the No Contact Order expired by its terms upon dismissal of 
the case, and because the alleged violation occurred while the case was 
pending, an expiration upon dismissal of the case provided clarity and 
finality. 
(R., Vol. I, p. 122). 
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Contrary to the trial court's interpretation, this Court has interpreted I.C.R. 46.2 to require 
that the specific date be expressly set forth and that the phrase "Whichever occurs first" follow 
the two expiration possibilities. By leaving the expiration date blank, the trial court in this case 
made the phrase "Whichever occurs first" superfluous and the order potentially confusing to the 
defendant. 
Twice now, this Court has emphasized the importance of including a date certain for 
expiration to avoid confusion. In State v. Castro, 145 Idaho 173, 177 P.3d 387 (2008), the Court 
explained that I.C.R. 46.2 was revised in 2004 because orders that simply contained the phrase 
"the no contact order will remain in effect until further order of the court" created unnecessary 
confusion. The Court stated that such generalized language "enshrined perpetuity." Id. at 175, 
177 P.3d at 389. Therefore, the Court revised the required language consistent with the present 
statute, to wit: "[t}hat the order will expire at 11:59 p.m. on a specific date, or upon dismissal of 
the case." Id. at 175-76, 177 P.3d at 389-90. 
The Castro Court stressed the importance of the inclusion of an expiration date because, 
as the Court stated, it "serves important public interests." Id. at 176, 177 P.3d at 390. The Court 
considered it so important, in fact, that it sent a clear message to the lower courts: 
[W]e expect iud2.es to provide a termination date, regardless of whether 
the motion to modify or terminate the no contact order is granted. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
In 2010 this Court took the opportunity to reinforce the requirement that judges provide a 
specific expiration date. In State v. Cobler, 148 Idaho 769, 22 P.3d 374 (2010), the Court 
considered a no contact order like the one in the present case. The Cobler order provided only a 
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termination date: the order "will expire ... upon dismissal of this case." Id at 771, 22 P.3d at 
376. The Cobler court referenced its holding in Castro, supra, and in even more direct language 
restated the requirement of a date certain for expiration: 
[WJe disapproved of no contact orders with "eternal existence" and 
indicated that all no contact orders issued after July 1, 2004, should have 
termination dates, regardless of whether a motion to modify or terminate 
the no contact order is granted. 
Id. at 772, 22 P3d at 377 (emphasis added). 
The Cobler court further reinforced the explicit requirement for an expiration date 
in a footnote. The Court noted that the no contact form at issue in the case provided a 
fill-in-the-blank for an expiration "or upon dismissal of the case." Id., n. l. The Court 
explained that in order for the form to comply with I.C.R. 46.2, the blank must be filled 
in with a specific expiration date. The Court stated: 
The form seems to give the judge one of two choices. However, in order to 
comply with the intent of I.C.R. 46.2, the judge should be given no right 
of selection between the two apparent choices. The second line of the 
form should contain no boxes and should read "at 11 :59 p.m. on 
_____ , or upon dismissal of this case, whichever first occurs["]. 
Id ( emphasis added). 
The form employed by Bonner County, and applied in this case, conforms with 
the Cobler instruction as to the proper expiration language. Bonner County's form 
avoids the "two choices" disapproved of in Cobler by adding the phrase "whichever first 
occurs." However, in the case at bar, the magistrate judge failed to fill-in the specific 
expiration date upon initial issuance or upon the order's modification. And, in her order 
denying dismissal, the magistrate even advocated the right to "two apparent choices" in 
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contravention of the Cobler instruction. 
C. The No Contact Order was Fatally Defective Because The State Cannot Prove 
Beyond a Reasonable Doubt that the Court Issued a Valid Order Pursuant to 
I.C. § 18-920. 
The no contact order in this case is fatally defective because the failure to comply with 
the criminal rule rendered the order invalid under LC. § 18-920. Because it is invalid, the State 
cannot prove the essential element of the crime: that a valid no contact order was issued by the 
court. 
In a criminal matter, the State must prove each element of the crime beyond a reasonable 
doubt. State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267,285, 77 P.3d 956, 974 (2003). Conviction for violation 
of a no contact order pursuant to LC. § 18-920 requires the State to prove each of the following 
elements: 
A violation of a no contact order is committed when: 
(a) A person has been charged or convicted under any offense defined in 
subsection (1) of this section; and 
(b) A no contact order has been issued, either by a court or by an Idaho 
criminal rule; and 
( c) The person charged or convicted has had contact with the stated person 
in violation of an order. 
LC. § 18-920(2). 
Implicit in the issuance element of the crime, LC. § 18-920(2)(b ), is that the order be 
valid under Idaho law. This Court has recognized "implicit" elements in criminal statutes. See 
State v. Olin, 112 Idaho 673, 676, 735 P.2d 984, 987 (1987). In Olin, the Court considered 
whether the words "rob," "robbery," "taking of property," implicitly describes an "intent" to 
permanently deprive the victim of the property under the robbery statute. The Court stated that 
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"[I]t was implicit in the common understanding of all those words that the conduct was not 
intended to be anything but permanent." Id at 676, 735 P.2d at 987. 
Likewise the State conceded, and the appellate court approved of an implicit element in 
the statute under consideration in this case, I.C. § 18-920. In State v. Hochrein, 154 Idaho 993, 
999, 303 P.3d 1249, 1255 (Ct. App. 2013), the court of appeals implied a "notice" element of 
proof that is not explicitly set forth in the statute. The court looked specifically at the criminal 
rule to derive an implied element. The court stated: 
Although section 18-920, under which Hochrein was charged, does not 
explicitly list prior notice of the no contact order as an element, the State 
concedes on appeal such notice is an essential element of the crime. The 
State points out that Idaho Criminal Rule 46.2, which implements section 
18-920, states, "No contact orders issued pursuant to Idaho Code § 18-
920 shall be in writing and served on or signed by the defendant." I.C.R. 
46.2(a). 
Hochrein at 999, 303 P.3d at 1255. 
Not only does this Court have authority to imply a validity element of proof under LC. § 
18-920, it would be wise for the Court to do so. Implying a validity element to the issuance 
prong would reinforce the Court's strong insistence that judges include an expiration date certain 
on the order. Prosecutors would then be attentive to its inclusion. It would have the same 
salutary effect on a judge issuing a no contact order as does the search and seizure jurisprudence 
have on a police officer searching a vehicle or dwelling. Without the sword of Damocles 
hanging about, judges and prosecutors will continue to ignore the Court's edict with regard to 
incorporating an expiration date on the no contact orders. 
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D. A Defective, But Clear No Contact Order Can Be Enforced Under the 
Contempt of Court Statute. 
It's important to note that by implying a validity element of proof under LC. § 18-920, 
courts and prosecutors would not be left without a punishment remedy where the court has 
inadvertently issued a defective no contact order. A court always has the power to hold in 
contempt a defendant who willfully violates a clear and unambiguous order of the court. LC. § 
18-105; State v. Rice, 145 Idaho 554,556, 181 P.3d 480,482 (2008). In this case, the prosecutor 
or the trial court, sua sponte, could have enforced the no contact order under the contempt of 
court statute because that statute does not impose an expiration date requirement. A court 
considering a contempt citation could properly look at the facts to determine if the order was so 
defective as to make it ambiguous. 
The distinction between a violation of a court order under the contempt statutes and a 
violation of the order under the criminal code has been addressed by the appellate court. In State 
v. Herren, 38783, 2012 WL 5464517 (App. Nov. 9, 2012), Review Granted (attached hereto as 
Addendum A), the defendant, Herren, was charged with a violation of a no contact order under 
LC. § 18-920. The court found that Herren was within 100 feet of McDermott in violation of the 
order. However, Herren did not touch or communicate with McDermott. The Court reversed the 
defendant's conviction because LC. § 18-920(c) requires proof that "The person charged ... has 
had contact with the stated person in the violation of an order." (Emphasis added). The Court 
concluded that the defendant's mere presence within 100 feet of McDermott was a violation of 
the order but the violation was not subject to prosecution under the criminal statute because no 
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"contact" had occurred. Importantly, the Court noted in footnote 3 that the order could still be 
enforced by "contempt." 
The Court did point out that this finding did not mean the lower court was not 
authorized to include an "in-the-presence" prohibition in the protective order. 
Although such a provision could not be enforced by the criminal statute, it could 
be enforceable by contempt or possibly other means. 
Id at n.3. 
In applying the logic of Herren to the case at bar, Hillbroom acknowledges that he 
violated the court's order when he had contact with Ms. Fournier. Consequently the trial court 
could have found Hillbroom in contempt sua sponte or upon petition of the State. The Court 
could have imposed the same sentence. But, because the order failed to comply with the 
criminal rule, setting forth both an expiration date and a terminating event, the order was invalid 
and therefore unenforceable as a crime under LC. § 18-920. 
VI. CONCLUSION. 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court must reverse the magistrate court and 
remand the case for dismissal. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this :3~ day of January, 2014. 
BERG & McLAUGHLIN, CHTD 
ilham M. Berg 
Attorney for Junior Hillbroom 
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State v. Herren, --- P.3d -··· (2012) 
2012 WL 5464517 
Only the Westlaw citation is currently available. 
NOTICE: THIS OPINION HAS NOT BEEN 
RELEASED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE 
PERMANENT LAW REPORTS. UNTIL RELEASED, 
ITIS SUBJECT TO REVISION OR WITHDRAWAL. 
Court of Appeals of Idaho. 
STATE ofldaho, Plaintiff-Respondent 
v. 
Nathan Wade HERREN, Defendant-Appellant. 
No. 38783. I Nov. 9, 2012. 
Synopsis 
Background: Following bench trial, magistrate found 
defendant guilty of violating no contact order (NCO) and 
violating probation previously imposed for misdemeanor 
malicious injury to property. Defendant filed intermediate 
appeal. The Fourth Judicial District Court, Ada County, 
Kathryn A. Sticklen, J., affirmed. Defendant appealed. 
[Holding:] The Court of Appeals, Gutierrez, J., held that 
defendant did not "contact" neighbor in violation of NCO. 
Reversed and remanded. 
Gratton, Chief Judge, filed dissenting opinion. 
West Headnotes ( 10) 
fl! Criminal Law 
,;=Decisions oflntermediate Courts 
On review of decision of district court, rendered 
in its appellate capacity, Court of Appeals 
reviews decision of district court directly. 
121 
[31 
141 
15! 
Criminal Law 
',-"Decisions oflntermediate Courts 
On review of decision of district court, rendered 
in its appellate capacity, Court of Appeals 
examines magistrate record to determine 
whether there is substantial and competent 
evidence to support magistrate's findings of fact 
and whether magistrate's conclusions of law 
follow from those findings. 
Criminal Law 
t=Decisions oflntennediate Courts 
On review of decision of district court, rendered 
in its appellate capacity, if magistrate's findings 
of fact are supported by substantial and 
competent evidence and conclusions follow 
therefrom and if district court affirmed 
magistrate's decision, Court of Appeals affirms 
district court's decision as matter of procedure. 
Criminal Law 
,_~, Statutory issues in general 
Court of Appeals exercises free review over 
application and construction of statutes. 
Statutes 
,, ... ,Plain language; plain, ordinary, common, or 
literal meaning 
Statutes 
,.,,.statute as a Whole; Relation of Parts to 
Whole and to One Another 
Where language of statute is plain and 
unambiguous, Court of Appeals must give effect 
to statute as written, without engaging in 
statutory construction; words must be given 
State v. Herren, --- P.3d ---- (2012) 
161 
17] 
[BJ 
their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning, and 
statute must be construed as a whole. 
Statutes 
c-Absence of Ambiguity; Application of Clear 
or Unambiguous Statute or Language 
Statutes 
,.PPlain, literal, or clear meaning; ambiguity 
When interpreting statutory language, if 
language is clear and unambiguous, there is no 
occasion for court to resort to legislative history 
or rules of statutory interpretation. 
Statutes 
,.~-Purpose and intent; determination thereof 
When Court of Appeals must engage in statutory 
construction because ambiguity exists in 
statutory language, court has duty to ascertain 
legislative intent and give effect to that intent 
Criminal Law 
•. ~Substantial evidence 
Criminal Law 
,.=Reasonable doubt 
Appellate review of sufficiency of evidence is 
limited in scope; finding of guilt will not be 
overturned on appeal where there is substantial 
evidence upon which reasonable trier of fact 
could have found prosecution sustained its 
burden of proving essential elements of crime 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
191 
1101 
Protection of Endangered Persons 
.="No contact" orders 
Although defendant violated no contact order 
(NCO) by remaining within l 00 feet of neighbor 
during homeowners' association meeting, 
defendant did not physically touch or 
communicate with neighbor, as required for 
criminal conviction for violation of NCO, but 
only made brief eye contact with neighbor, 
which did not amount to "contact." West's 
LC.A. § 18-920(2). 
Protection of Endangered Persons 
.• ="No contact'' orders 
Statute criminalizing violations of no contact 
order (NCO) only criminalizes violations of 
NCO where violation was contact in form of 
physical touching and/or communicating. 
West's LC.A. § 18-920(2). 
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Opinion 
GUTJERREZ, Judge. 
*1 Nathan Wade Herren appeals from the district court's 
order, on intermediate appeal, affirming his judgment of 
conviction entered upon the magistrate's verdict finding 
him guilty of violation of a no contact order and affirming 
the revocation of his withheld judgment based on the 
magistrate's finding that he was in violation of his 
probation. For the reasons set forth below, we reverse and 
remand the case. 
Staie v. Herren, --· P.3d ---- (2012) 
I. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURE 
In the course of an ongoing dispute between Herren and 
his neighbor, William McDermott, Herren cut down a 
portion of McDermott's fence. Herren was charged with 
felony malicious injury to property and, pursuant to a plea 
agreement, pied guilty to an amended charge of 
misdemeanor malicious injury to property. The court 
entered a withheld judgment and placed Herren on 
probation for two years. In addition, the court entered a no 
contact order (NCO), providing, in relevant part, that 
Herren could not "knowingly remain within 100 feet of' 
McDermott. 
Months later, Herren filed a motion to modify the NCO to 
allow him to attend homeowners' association meetings 
where McDermott, an association board member, would 
likely be present. Herren failed to request a hearing on the 
motion and no modification was entered. Nevertheless, 
Herren attended an association meeting at a local school. 
When Herren first arrived, McDermott was not present, 
but once McDermott entered the meeting room, Herren 
made brief eye contact with him and moved to the back of 
the room. McDem10tt contacted law enforcement, who 
responded to the scene. Herren stated he believed he was 
more than 100 feet from McDermott. Herren was arrested 
for violation of the NCO after the responding officer 
determined Herren had been sitting well closer than 100 
feet from McDermott. Herren was charged with violating 
the NCO, Idaho Code § 18-920, and violating his 
probation by committing a new crime. 
Following a bench trial, the magistrate found Herren 
guilty of violating the NCO by knowingly remaining 
within 100 feet of McDermott at the meeting. The 
magistrate entered a judgment of conviction. Herren 
admitted to violating his probation by being convicted of 
the NCO violation, and the magistrate revoked Herren's 
withheld judgment for malicious injury to property. 
Herren timely appealed his judgment of conviction for 
violating the NCO and the revocation of his withheld 
judgment to the district court. He filed a motion to 
consolidate the appeals, which the district court granted. 
Following a hearing, the district court affirmed Herren's 
judgment of conviction for violating the NCO, the 
probation violation finding, and the revocation of his 
withheld judgment. Herren now appeals to this Court. 
II. 
ANALYSIS 
Herren contends his judgment of conviction for violating 
the NCO should be vacated because the magistrate did not 
find he had "contact" with McDermott in violation of the 
NCO as required by the statute and there is insufficient 
evidence to support such a finding. He also contends the 
order revoking his withheld judgment should be reversed 
because the NCO conviction cannot properly form the 
basis of the probation violation where it was not 
supported by sufficient evidence. 
*2 111 121 131 On review of a decision of the district court, 
rendered in its appellate capacity, we review the decision 
of the district court directly. Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 
Idaho 670, 672, 183 P.3d 758, 760 (2008); State v. 
DeWitt, 145 Idaho 709, 711, 184 P.3d 215, 217 
(Ct.App.2008). We examine the magistrate record to 
determine whether there is substantial and competent 
evidence to support the magistrate's findings of fact and 
whether the magistrate's conclusions of law follow from 
those findings. Losser, 145 Idaho at 672, 183 P.3d at 760; 
DeWitt, 145 Idaho at 711, 184 P.3d at 217. If those 
findings are so supported and the conclusions follow 
therefrom and if the district court affirmed the 
magistrate's decision, we affirm the district court's 
decision as a matter of procedure. Losser, 145 Idaho at 
672, 183 P.3d at 760; DeWitt, 145 Idaho at 711, 184 P.3d 
at 217. 
141 151 161 Pl This Court exercises free review over the 
application and construction of statutes. State v. Reyes, 
139 Idaho 502, 505, 80 P.3d 1103, 1106 (Ct.App.2003). 
Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, 
this Court must give effect to the statute as written, 
without engaging in statutory construction. State v. 
Burnight, 132 Idaho 654,659, 978 P.2d 214,219 (1999); 
State v. Escobar, 134 Idaho 387, 389, 3 P.3d 65, 67 
(Ct.App.2000). The words must be given their plain, 
usual, and ordinary meaning, and the statute must be 
construed as a whole. State v. Hart, 135 Idaho 827, 829, 
25 P.3d 850, 852 (2001). If the language is clear and 
unambiguous, there is no occasion for the court to resort 
to legislative history or rules of statutory interpretation. 
facobar, 134 Idaho at 389, 3 P.3d at 67. When this Court 
must engage in statutory construction because an 
ambiguity exists, it has the duty to ascertain the legislative 
intent and give effect to that intent. State v. Beard, 135 
State v. Herren, --- P.3d ---· (2012) 
Idaho 641, 646, 22 P.3d 1 16, 121 (Ct.App.200 l ). 
181 Appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence is 
limited in scope. A finding of guilt will not be overturned 
on appeal where there is substantial evidence upon which 
a reasonable trier of fact could have found the prosecution 
sustained its burden of proving the essential elements of a 
crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Herrera-Brito, 
I 31 Idaho 383, 385, 957 P.2d 1099, 1101 (Ct.App.1998); 
Statn:. Knutson, 121 Idaho 101,104,822 P.2d 998, 1001 
(Ct.App.1991 ). 
191 Idaho Code § 18-920(2), under which Herren was 
convicted, provides that a violation of an NCO is 
committed when: 
(a) A person has been charged or convicted under any 
offense defined in subsection ( 1) of this section; and 
(b) A no contact order has been issued, either by a court 
or by an Idaho criminal rule; and 
( c) The person charged or convicted has had contact 
with the stated person in violation of an order. 
(Emphasis added). 
In finding Herren guilty of the NCO violation, the 
magistrate found the State presented proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt that Herren violated the order by 
knowingly remaining within 1 00 feet of McDermott and, 
without analysis, concluded this act amounted to a 
violation of section 18-920(2). The district court affirmed 
these findings. On appeal, Herren argues the courts' 
conclusion that he violated section 18-920(2) by 
knowingly remaining within 100 feet of McDermott is 
erroneous because the common usage of the word 
"contact" in the statute dictates that the only violation of 
an NCO criminalized by the statute is that which involves 
some manner of "communication or physical touching." 
The State counters that section 18-920(2) "does not, and 
is not intended to, define the meaning of the word 
'contact' for purposes of determining whether a violation 
of a no contact order has occurred" and any violation of a 
NCO suffices. 
*3 The provision in the NCO at issue states: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that 
[Herren] shall not contact 
(including: in person or through 
another person, or in ·writing or 
e-mail, or by telephone, pager or 
facsimile) or attempt to contact, 
harass, follow, communicate with, 
or knowingly remain within 100 
feet of: [McDermott]. 
Thus, it is apparent that by remaining within 100 feet of 
McDermott during the meeting, Herren violated the NCO, 
which he concedes on appeal; however, the question is 
whether this violation of the NCO can amount to a 
violation of section 18-920(2). 
In arguing he cannot be found to have violated section 
18-920(2) because he did not have "contact" with 
McDermott according to the plain and ordinary meaning 
of the word, Herren cites to Cooper v. Cooper, 144 P.3d 
451 (Alaska 2006). In Cooper, a protective order 
prohibited the defendant (Husband) from, among other 
things, being in the physical presence of his estranged 
wife (Wife). Based on several instances where Wife saw 
and made eye contact with Husband in various public 
places, including the mall, a bar conference and on the 
street, Wife claimed Husband committed the crime of 
violating the protective order, because, inter alia, 
Husband's conduct amounted to "contacting," which was 
prohibited by the protective order. The Alaska Supreme 
Court noted that for a defendant to be guilty under 
Alaska's statute criminalizing the violation of a protective 
order, ALASKA STAT. § l 1.56.740(a)(l),' the 
underlying protective order must contain at least one of 
seven prohibitions enumerated in Alaska Statutes § 
18.66. lO0(c )(1 )-(7).2 On this basis, the Court found the 
statute implies that only a violation of a prohibition listed 
in section 18.66.l00(c)(l)-(7) may constitute the crime of 
violating a protective order. Cooper, 144 P.3d at 457. The 
Court found it was significant that the protective order's 
requirement that Husband not be in the physical presence 
of Wife was not a prohibition explicitly listed in section 
18.66.100( c )(1 )-(7) and, therefore, it was questionable 
whether Husband's acts could form the basis of a criminal 
violation of the protective order.3 Cooper, 144 P.3d at 
457. 
Important to the issue we address in this case, the Cooper 
court rejected Wife's argument that Husband's acts of 
appearing within Wife's sight in public places fell within 
one of the enumerated prohibitions listed in section 
18.66.100( c)(l )-(7)--specifically, subsection ( c )(2) of 
section 18.66.100, which provides a protective order may 
"prohibit the respondent from ... contacting, or otherwise 
communicating directly or indirectly with the petitioner." 
(Emphasis added.) Cooper, 144 P.3d at 457. Although 
recognizing the argument was not "implausible," the court 
rejected it on the basis that the "common usage" of 
"contacting," as a verb, means "physically touching or 
communicating." Id. at 457-58 (citing WEBSTER'S 
THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY). 
,Stale v. Herren, --- P.3d ---- (2012) 
Noting the general rule of statutory interpretation, that 
words in statutes are to be construed in accordance with 
their normal usage unless there is some indication a 
special meaning is intended, the Court concluded the 
context of "contacting" in the relevant statute indicated 
that adherence to the normal meaning of the word was 
appropriate. Id. at 458. Thus, the Court held that 
Husband's acts of merely being present in a public place 
while Wife was also present, with contact limited to one 
or two seconds of unplanned eye contact and absent any 
other communication or touching, were insufficient to 
establish Husband violated the no contact prohibition 
where the statute criminalizing a violation of a protective 
order required the violating behavior be one of the 
enumerated acts. Id 
*4 1101 As we indicated above, where the language of a 
statute is plain and unambiguous, this Court must give 
effect to the statute as written, without engaging in 
statutory construction, Burnight, 132 Idaho at 659, 978 
P.2d at 219, and the words of the statute are to be given 
their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning, Hart, 135 Idaho 
at 829, 25 P.3d at 852. Thus, although the State attempts 
to distinguish Cooper from the case at hand, we are 
constrained to conclude, based on our rules of statutory 
interpretation, that section 18-920(2), like Alaska's 
statute at the time, does not criminalize all violations of 
an NCO. As recognized by the Alaska Supreme Court in 
Cooper, and as undisputed by the State in this appeal, the 
"common usage" of "contacting," as a verb, means 
"physically touching or communicating." Cooper, 144 
P.3d at 457-58. Thus, by its plain language, section 
18-920(2) only criminalizes violations of an NCO where 
the violation was contact in the form of physical touching 
and/or communicating. 
In resisting this interpretation of the statute, the State 
argues: 
It is apparent from a plain reading 
of the statute and the rule 
referenced therein [Idaho Criminal 
Rule 46.2] that the legislature did 
not intend to define or limit the 
meaning of the word contact for 
purposes of the content of any 
particular no contact order or for 
purposes of what will constitute a 
violation of the order. 
However, although the Legislature may not have 
consciously intended to exclude the activity at issue in 
this case, that is exactly what it did by its choice of 
language, and we are constrained by adherence to our 
rules of statutory construction to give effect to the plain 
language of the statute. Indeed, there is an argument that 
had the Legislature intended the interpretation urged by 
the State, it would have stated in the statute that any 
violation of an NCO could form the basis of the offense, 
as opposed to explicitly requiring "contact" in violation of 
an NCO. See, e.g., LC. § 18-7905 (defining first degree 
stalking as, inter alia, a violation of Idaho Code § 
18-7906 and where the "actions constituting the offense 
are in violation of a temporary restraining order, 
protection order, no contact order or injunction, or any 
combination thereof'). 
Here, it is undisputed the lower courts found Herren' s act 
of knowingly remaining within 100 feet of McDermott 
was violative of the NCO. However, such an act does not 
amount to physical touching and/or communicating (a 
point the State does not contest) and, thus, cannot be 
considered "contact" pursuant to section 18-920(2). 
Accordingly, we conclude the State failed to sustain its 
burden of proving each element of the offense beyond a 
reasonable doubt because there was no evidence Herren 
had "contact" with McDermott in violation of the NCO as 
required by the plain language of the statute. Because the 
magistrate's finding that Herren violated probation was 
premised upon this conviction, which in turn caused the 
magistrate to revoke Herren's withheld judgment, the 
order revoking Herren's withheld judgment on this basis 
must be reversed. The district court's order, on 
intermediate appeal, affirming Herren's judgment of 
conviction for violation of an NCO and affirming 
revocation of Herren 's withheld judgment is reversed, and 
the case is remanded for proceedings consistent with this 
opinion: 
Judge MELANSON concurs. 
Chief Judge GRATTON, dissenting. 
*5 I respectfully dissent. I believe that the term "contact" 
in the context of the legal prohibition, i.e., "no contact," is 
well understood and consistent with the use of the term in 
Idaho Code § 18-920(2)(c). I submit that the plain 
meaning of"contact" to anyone involved in the context of 
a no contact order (as opposed to say the business world) 
includes being in the vicinity of the other person. I further 
submit that the term "contact" is, by virtue of the statutory 
language in J.C. § 18-920 and Idaho Criminal Rule 46.2, 
defined as that which is set out in the no contact order 
itself, which must include a distance restriction. The 
majority, unfortunately, limits itself to a generic definition 
Sr.ate v. Herren, --- P.3d ---- (2012) 
of the word ''contact" without regard to the legal and 
commonly understood context of"no" contact orders. 
l do not believe it is appropriate that when our standards 
of statutory construction call for application of the plain 
meaning of a word, that we immediately consult 
Webster's Dictionary. The plain meaning of a word is as 
commonly understood and articulated within the context 
used, not some generic Webster's Dictionary definition. 
This case highlights just how we should not rely on one of 
Webster's Dictionary's several definitions of "contact." 
Herren argues that "contact" means "physical touching or 
communicating." Herren and the majority adopt this 
definition of "contact" from Cooper v. Cooper, 144 P.3d 
451, 457-58 (Alaska 2006), which, in tum, purportedly 
adopted the definition from Webster's Dictionary.' Since 
there is no physical touching in this case, Herren and the 
majority then are required to delve into what is meant by 
"communicating." Herren argues and the majority agrees 
that being in someone's presence is not communicating 
and, moreover, brief eye contact is not communicative 
and, thus, not contact, so long as there is no non-verbal 
communication involved with the eye contact, which I 
suppose to mean the old evil eye. So, "contact" actually 
becomes "communicating" and then we are required to 
define "communicating," and so on. Through this 
circuitous route the majority determines that knowingly 
being in another's presence is not "contact" within the 
meaning of J.C. § 18--920(2)(c), because there is no 
touching or communicating. 
Idaho Code § 18--920, under which Herren was 
prosecuted, is entitled: "Violation of No Contact Order." 
(Emphasis added.) Subsection (2) states: 
(2) A violation of a no contact order is committed 
when: 
(a) A person has been charged or convicted under 
any offense defined in subsection (1) of this section; 
and 
(b) A no contact order has been issued, either by a 
court or by an Idaho criminal rule; and 
(c) The person charged or convicted has had contact 
with the stated person in violation of an order. 
(Emphasis added.) To say that the term "contact" in LC. § 
18-920(2)(c) does not draw meaning from the "no contact 
Footnotes 
The statute has since been amended. 
order " is untenable. Idaho Criminal Rule 46.2, entitled 
"[n]o contact orders," states that no contact orders issued 
pursuant to l.C. § 18-920 must be in writing and served 
on the defendant. Each judicial district shall adopt by 
administrative order a form for no contact orders. The rule 
further provides that: 
*6 No contact orders must contain, at a minimum, the 
following information: 
(1) The case number, defendant's name and victim's 
name; 
(2) A distance restriction; 
(3) That the order will expire at l I :59 p.m. on a 
specific date, or upon dismissal of the case; 
( 4) An advisory that: 
(a) A violation of the order may be prosecuted as a 
separate crime under I.C. § 18-920 for which no 
bail will be set until an appearance before a judge, 
and the possible penalties for this crime, .... 
I.C.R. 46.2(a). (Emphasis added.) It is clear from the full 
statute that that the "contact" which is "in violation of 
[the] order," identified in LC. § 18-920(2)(c), is that 
which is set out in the order. It is clear from the rule that 
the "contact" which is punishable by J.C. § 18--920 is that 
which is set out in the order. It is also clear from the 
required language in the no contact order itself, which 
includes an advisory that violation of the order may be 
prosecuted under J.C. § 18-920, that it is the "contact" 
described in the order which is punishable under LC. § 
18-920. One need not resort to Webster's Dictionary to 
determine what "contact" means in the context of a no 
contact order. If fact, the Webster's Dictionary definition, 
presents much more confusion and less certainty than the 
language of the order which must be served on the 
defendant. 
In this case, Herren does not seriously contest that he 
knowingly remained with I 00 feet of McDermott in 
violation of the no contact order. Thus, I respectfully 
dissent. 
, State v. Herren, --- P.3d ---· (2012) 
3 
4 
2 Alaska Statutes § 18.66.100( c )( I }-(7) provided that a protective order may: 
( 1) prohibit the respondent from threatening to commit or committing domestic violence, stalking. or harassment; 
(2) prohibit the respondent from telephoning. contacting, or otherwise communicating directly or indirectly with the 
petitioner; 
(3) remove and exclude the respondent from the residence of the petitioner, regardless of ownership of the residence; 
( 4) direct the respondent to stay away from the residence. school, or place of employment of the petitioner or any specified 
place frequented by the petitioner or any designated household member; 
(5) prohibit the respondent from entering a propelled vehicle in the possession of or occupied by the petitioner; 
(6) prohibit the respondent from using or possessing a deadly weapon if the court finds the respondent was in the actual 
possession of or used a weapon during the commission of domestic violence; 
(7) direct the respondent to surrender any firearm owned or possessed by the respondent if the court finds that the respondent 
was in the actual possession of or used a firearm during the eommission of the domestic violence[.] 
The Court did point out that this finding did not mean the lower court was not authorized to include an "in-the-presence'' 
prohibition in the protective order. Although such a provision could not be enforced by the criminal statute, it could be enforceable 
by contempt or possibly other means. Cooper v. Cooper. 144 P.3d 451. 457 (Alaska 2006). 
We note that although Herren's conduct of knowingly remaining within 100 feet of McDermott may not form the basis of a 
violation of Idaho Code § 18-920(2), it may nonetheless constitute a violation of the NCO and still be a violation of his probation, 
depending on the terms of probation. Therefore, revocation of Herren· s withheld judgment may still be appropriate. 
The phrase "physical touching or communicating" does not appear in Webster's Third New International Dictionary, and, instead, 
appears to be the Alaska Court's amalgam of words found therein. 
End Document 2CJ'i Thon-ison Reuters, No c!airn to original U,S_ Governrnent \/Vorks, 
